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COMMENTS
a future date, the attempted gift is in futuro and fails. 15 On
the other hand, if the condition does not necessarily precede
the vesting of such right, but may accompany it or follow it,
the condition is a condition subsequent-6 and the gift is valid.
Though there is no implied-in-fact condition involved, nor does
it appear that the law would imply one, there is the problem
as to whether things given by a mother to her youngest daughter
"in anticipation of marriage" makes the gift subject to an ex-
press condition precedent. The facts show that the daughter
was unmarried at the time of placing the blanket in the chest,
but do not disclose whether or not she was married at the time
of her mother's death. Thus, the acts of the donor in the prin-
cipal case are entirely consistent with the possibility that the
mother made a gift subject to a condition precedent, yet the
court easily found that such acts corroborated an intent to make
an absolute gift inter vivos. It is submitted that the court placed
too much emphasis on the statement by the mother, and that
the facts, being open to an interpretation inconsistent with the
statement, were not sufficient to validate a parol gift of the
blanket, much less the money contained therein.
IRVING MALNIK
TORTS - A WIFE'S RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR Loss OF CON-
SORTIUM DUE TO THE NEGLIGENT INJURY OF HER HUSBAND.
Plaintiff's husband was negligently injured by one of defendant's
employees. As a result of the severe bodily injuries sustained
by her husband, the plaintiff was deprived of any future sexual
relations with him.
She brought an action to recover for the negligent injury to
her consortium. In reversing the lower court's dismissal of the
complaint, the court recognized that all other jurisdictions de-
nied recovery to the wife under such circumstances. Neverthe-
less, the Court of Appeals chose to disregard the numerous
precedents holding the wife has no cause of action on the ground
that those precedents were based on faulty reasoning. In a
comprehensive opinion, Judge Clark exhaustively reviewed the
cases denying recovery and rejected the reasons for the denial
15. Walden's Administrators v. Dixon, 5 T.B. Mon (Ky.) 176 (1827);
Moore v. Layton, 147 Md. 244, 127 Atl. 756 (1925).
16. Beatty's Estate v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N.E. 432 (1898).
Washington University Open Scholarship
262 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
as ill-founded. The essence of the court's opinion was that the
so-called sentimental elements of consortium (i. e., affection,
companionship, sexual relations, and the like) 1 are legally recog-
nized interests protected by all courts against intentional inva-
sion; that the injuries to the consortium of one spouse arising
out of negligent injury to the other spouse are neither too re-
mote nor consequential within the rules of proximate cause;
and that it is utterly illogical and inconsistent to afford redress
to the husband for injury to the sentimental aspects of his con-
sortium arising out of negligent injury to his wife and to deny
the same relief to the wife when her husband is negligently
injured.2
Prior to the Argonne case the authorities were unanimous
in denying a cause of action to the wife when her husband was
negligently injured.3 The Restatement of Torts denies any sort
of recovery to the wife where the act of the defendant is not
directed at the marriage relation itself.4 On the other hand the
legal writers, arguing for a recovery of the wife, have been
almost unanimous in condemning the existing case law,' and
1. The courts commonly refer to all those other elements composing the
consortium other than the right to material services as the sentimental
elements of consortium.
2. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950). An
additional point involved in the case was whether the broadly worded
workmen's compensation statute of the District barred an action of this
kind. It was held that it did not.
3. See infra notes 8, 13, 14, 17 and 22. See Notes, 5 A.L.R. 1049 (1918);
59 A.L.R. 680 (1928). The only previous case permitting recovery by the
wife for a negligent injury to her husband was Hipp v. E. I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921). This case was overruled
in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
In a recent Georgia case the six man Court of Appeals split evenly on the
issue whether a wife could recover. The discussion was necessarily dicta,
however, for it was found that the defendant owed no duty of ordinary
care to the injured husband. McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d
299 (1949).
4. "A married woman is not entitled to recover from one who, by his
tortious conduct against her husband has become liable to him for illness
or other bodily harm caused thereby to any of her marital interests or for
any expense incurred in providing medical treatment for her husband."
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 695 (1938). North Carolina appears to be the only
state going so far as to allow a wife to recover medical expenses incurred
in caring for her negligently injured husband. McDaniel v. Trent Mills,
197 N.C. 342, 148 S.E. 440 (1929).
5. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 948 (1941); Holbrook, The
Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1923); Lipp-
man, The Breakdown of Consortium, 39 COL. L. RE. 651 (1930); Notes, 5
CORNELL L. Q. 171 (1920); 9 IND. L. J. 182 (1937); 35 KY. L. REV. 220
(1947); 1 MERCER L. REV. 316 (1949); 14 ST. JOHN'S L. REa. 345 (1940).
The lone attempt to justify the state of the case law is to be found in
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the weight of authority permits the husband to recover for in-
jury to the sentimental elements of his consortium when his
wife is negligently injured.,
The cases have assigned various reasons for the inability of
the wife to recover. A reason sometimes advanced is that the
action by the husband for injury to his wife is essentially one
for loss of the material services of his wife, and that since the
wife has no corresponding right to the services of her husband
there is no corresponding basis for her recovery.7 However, the
recovery of the husband was never limited to the value of the
material services; the amount of injury to the sentimental ele-
ments is included in calculating the damages due the husband.
Lippman8 states that the right to material services, society,
affection, and companionship is an amalgamation of individual
rights all bound up in "one big inseparable package" called con-
sortium. He says that, although the action of the husband was
spoken of as one for loss of services; affection, intercourse, etc.
were included within the concept of services-they were services
to be rendered the husband by the wife. Indeed, to an action
by the husband for injury to the sentimental elements alone a
plea that he alleged no loss of material services has been held
no defense."
Judge Clark dealt with this argument in his opinion. He
attributed the misconception that the loss of material services
is essential to a cause of action to the redundancy of common
law pleading, an allegation of the loss of services being almost
invariably included in the declaration. He then said:
Consortium, although it embraces within its ambit of mean-
ing the wife's material services, also includes love, affection,
companionship, sexual relations, etc. all welded into a con-
Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH. L. REv.
177, 194 (1916).
6. See Notes, 21 A.L.R. 1517 (1922); 133 A.L.R. 1156 (1941). Some of
the majority profess to base recovery solely on loss of services but in
reality allow compensation of the sentimental elements.
7. Boden v. Del-mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Fenff v.
New York Cent. R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Stout v. Kansas
City Terminal Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913) ; Smith v.
Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
8. The Breakdown of Consortium, 22 MIcH. L. REV. 651, 667 (1930).
9. "The action was per quod consortium amisit, not per quod servitum.
In no early case is there a suggestion that any of these [elements] is
superior to any other as a basis for legal redress." Guevin v. Manchester
St. Ry., 78 N.H. 289, 292, 99 Atl. 298, 300 (1916).
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ceptualistic unity .... It is not the fact that one or the
other of the elements of consortium is injured in a par-
ticular invasion that controls the type of action that may
be brought but rather that the consortium as such has been
injured at all.10
If a showing of loss of material services was ever essential to
a cause of action that is no longer true today, and the require-
ment of alleging such a loss which survives in some jurisdictions
is an outmoded fiction.11 The principal case appears correct in
holding that the loss of services argument should not be em-
ployed to bar a recovery by the wife.
A second reason sometimes advanced is that the husband
recovers for all the harm done in his action and that to permit
the wife to maintain an additional action would result in a
double recovery for the same tort.1 2 This argument proceeds
on the theory that the wife indirectly benefits from a recovery
by the husband. It is pointed out that he is under a duty to
support her and that the tort-feasor indemnifies the husband
for any loss of earnings so that his ability to support his wife
is undiminished. But the wife does not seek compensation for
loss of support; she seeks redress for her loss of companionship
and affection. One case said, "Her indirect loss has already
been compensated for by the recovery of the husband. There
was only one injury and that was to the husband. There can
be no double recovery for the same wrong." 13 The fallacy in
this statement lies in the fact that there was not only one
injury-there were two. The husband has suffered his physical
incapacitation and loss of earnings and has been compensated
therefor, but the injuries to the sentimental elements of the
consortium of the wife were not redressed in his action.
To be sure the danger of a double recovery does exist to some
extent. The jury might have a tendency to include within the
damages granted the wife such items as medical expenses which
10. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc. 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
11. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 940ff.
12. Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100
(1937) ; Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918) ; Gambino
v. Manufacturer's Coal & Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 158 S.W. 77 (1913);
Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1900). See
Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH L. REv.
177, 194 (1916).
13. Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 261, 72 P.2d
1100, 1101 (1937).
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were recoverable in the action by the husband himself. How-
ever, the administrative machinery of the courts should be
capable of alleviating this danger. The judge by proper instruc-
tions and a close supervision of the jury could fairly insure that
the jury return a verdict giving damages for only those injuries
personal to the wife. The reduction of excessive verdicts in
other cases is not an uncommon practice. Moreover, the judge
might well direct a verdict when the consortium of the wife
did not appear to have been appreciably injured. For example,
the wife should not be entitled to compensation where her hus-
band suffered no more than a broken wrist, but she should cer-
tainly be considered injured to an extent necessitating recovery
if her husband suffered emasculation or permanent hospitaliza-
tion.
As was pointed out in the Argonne case, the same possibility
of overlapping recovery exists when the husband brings his
action for negligent injury to the wife, and yet the great
majority of the courts permit him to recover. The logical in-
consistency of denying the right to the wife for this reason
while granting it to the husband is thus apparent. The Argonne
case appears correct in holding that this argument should not
be permitted to prevent compensation of the wife where the
facts indicate she has suffered an appreciable injury.
A third reason sometimes advanced is a proximate cause
limitation. The injury to the wife is said to be too remote,
indirect, and inconsequential to be compensable in damages. 14
It would appear that the rules of proximate cause prevailing in
most jurisdictions can not be said to bar the action for redress
of the wife's injury. There is no intervening force involved, and
14. "Were we to sustain plaintiff's contentions .. . then carried to its
logical conclusions, there would, in many accident cases, be litigation
almost without end all based on a single tort and with only one individual
physically involved in the accident itself." Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195
Minn. 378, 380, 263 N.W. 154, 155 (1935). "1... In a case involving mere
negligence, after the husband had recovered for all that his injury included
if there was yet in the background another claim by the wife so indefinite
and so immeasurable as possibly to drain the resources of him who was
so unfortunate through himself or his servant as to have become careless,
if this could be, industrial hazard would be widened beyond reason." Stout
v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 172 Mo. App. 113, 123, 157 S.W. 1019, 1022
(1913). Tyler v. Brown-Service Funeral Home Co., 250 Ala. 295, 34 So.2d
203 (1948); Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912);
Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N.Y. Supp. 534 (2d Dept.
1934).
Washington University Open Scholarship
266 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
certainly the results can not be said to be highly extraordinary
under the circumstances. Nor would the wife appear to be an
unforeseeable plaintiff within the usual meaning of that term.
The principal case dealt with the proximate cause limitation in
this way, .... we are committed to the rule in negligence cases
that where in the natural-sequence, unbroken by any intervening
cause, an injury is produced which, but for the negligent act
would not have occurred, the wrongdoer will be held liable."'1 ,
Assuming, arguendo, that the proximate cause limitation is
apropos and that a court is justified in limiting recovery to the
person physically injured, the difficulty remains that the same
proximate cause limitation should be applicable to the husband
when he brings an action for injury to the sentimental elements
of his consortium. As has been repeatedly asked :'16 How can the
injury to the wife be more remote and inconsequential than that
to the husband? Thus the logical inconsistency of denying the
right to the wife while according it to the husband is again
apparent.
A fourth commonly urged reason for denying the right of the
wife to recover is that she had no such right at common law,
and that the Married Women's Acts conferred no new rights
but merely permitted the assertion of those that did exist.17
Perhaps the courts are correct in saying that no right whatever
to the consortium existed in the wife at common law. Blackstone
intimates that it did not.18 Moreover, Holbrook points out that
the chancery never attempted to protect these sentimental
interests and says from this it might be inferred that the wife
was considered to have no right in them.19 On the other hand
it might be argued that so far as equity is concerned it was
generally loath to interfere in such personal relations anyway,
and that at law the right existed latently but was simply unen-
15. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
16. See Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 632, 208 S.W. 462, 467 (1918)
(dissenting opinion); Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 771, 270
N.Y. Supp. 534, 535 (2nd Dept. 1934) (dissenting opinion).
17. Sobolewski v. German, 2 Harr. 540, 127 Atl. 49 (Super. Ct. Del.
1924); Cravens v. L & N R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Emerson
v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl. 538 (1918) ; Nash v. Mobile & 0. R.R., 149
Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928); Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W.
462 (1918); Tobiassen v. Polley, 96 N.J.L. 66, 114 Atl. 153 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
18. 3 BL. CoMm. 142.
19. Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MiCH. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1923).
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forceable. The issue is best dismissed as moot, for it would
appear to be a useless excursion into Hohfeldian terminology to
attempt a determination of whether a right could ever be said
to exist without any means of enforcing it. Furthermore,
whether the right existed at common law should be considered
immaterial. Certainly a rule resting solely on an historical
basis would have little to commend it. The view of the Argonne
case was that the proper question should not be whether the
right existed at common law, but rather whether it should exist.
It was said that in this enlightened age the primary concern
should be whether an injury has occurred which is in need of
redress.
It is also pointed out in the principal case that the interests of
the wife in the marriage relation cannot now be said to be legally
incognizable. The existence of causes of action for alienation
of affections and criminal conversation testify to the fact that at
least under certain circumstances the wife's consortium is con-
sidered worthy of legal protection. Some jurisdictions have
extended the protection of the wife's consortium to some types
of intentional conduct not directed at the marriage relation
itself. Thus the defendant has been held liable for supplying
drugs to the husband 2 or for furnishing intoxicating liquor to an
alcoholic husband over the repeated protests of the wife though
no Dramshop Act existed in the juridiction.21 The next step
would appear to be obvious. If the wife is considered to have
an interest worthy of protection against intentional invasion the
question arises as to why that interest should not be protected
against negligent injury. It is obvious that one wife may suffer
as great a loss of her husband's society because of his being
negligently injured as another may suffer because her husband
has been induced to desert her.
One argument might appear to be sufficient answer to the
above line of reasoning. Some cases employ the frequently
quoted phrase that "the interest in the husband's life and com-
panionship lies in a region into which the law does not enter
except when necessity compels. ' 2 2 They reason that the senti-
20. Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912);
Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917).
21. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940); Swanson v. Ball,
67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940).
22. Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 11, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Stout v.
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mental elements of the consortium are too intangible and vague
to be capable of pecuniary measurement for the purpose of
giving compensation. It is said that the damages given in the
case of intentional interference with the marriage relation are
not given by way of compensation but rather as punishment.
They are to serve as a deterrent to future similar tortious acts.
It is then said that though the law reluctantly assesses damages
as a penalty in the case of intentional wrong such action is not
necessary in the case of a mere negligent injury.
The Argonne case points out, however, that the allowance of
exemplary damages does not widen the range of actionable
wrong, that the basic function of civil damages is that of com-
pensation, not punishment. Hence, the basis of actions for
alienation of affection and the like must be considered the pro-
viding of redress, and there can therefore be no reason for
distinguishing between intentional and negligent injuries on
this ground, for in either case an injury has been inflicted.
The Argonne case might have added that the inability to
measure accurately the amount of injury inflicted in other
negligence cases has never been considered a bar to an attempt
at complete redress. For example, it is probably no more difficult
to place a value upon the pain from a broken leg than it is to
evaluate the loss of the pleasure of sexual relations with one's
husband, yet the former is undertaken without misgivings.
An additional difficulty remains with the reasoning of the
majority. Again we detect the logical inconsistency of denying
to the wife the action for negligent injury to her consortium
while according it to the husband when his is injured, as the
majority does. The above reason for denying the right to the
wife would be equally applicable where the right of the husband
to the intangible elements was involved.
A review of the 'cases and the reasons supporting them
reveals that the present state of the law in the majority of the
jurisdictions has little to commend it. If we disregard the ulti-
mate question of whether anyone should be permitted to recover
for negligent injury to the sentimental elements of his consor-
tium, one thing remains clear-it is logically inconsistent to
permit a recovery by the husband while denying it to the wife.
Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S. W. 1019 (1913);
Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
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Leaving aside the rather specious argument that since the wife
did not have a cause of action at common law and that since the
Married Women's Acts conferred no new rights upon her, she
does not have it now, those reasons advanced to defeat recovery
by the wife would, whatever their merit, be equally applicable
to an action by the husband to recover for negligent injury to
the sentimental, as distinguished from the material, elements
of his consortium. There is evidence that the courts are becom-
ing aware of the incongruous state of the law and that the trend
is to correct it.
Six jurisdictions have taken a different approach from that of
the Argonne case in bringing symmetry to the law. Rather than
extend the cause of action for negligence to the female spouse,
these courts have chosen to deny reparation to the male for
injury to the sentimental elements.23 The cases have proceeded
on the theory that the Married Women's Acts have taken away
the husband's right to the material services of his wife so that
he stands on precisely the same footing as she. They have then
applied the same reasons advanced to deny recovery by the wife
to the husband. These decisions do at least have the merit of
ending the logical inconsistency still prevailing in the majority
of jurisdictions.
The Argonne case has supplied rather persuasive answers to
the objections ordinarily interposed against the wife's recovery.
The problem, however, is essentially one of policy of the same
general kind normally subsumed under the guise of "proximate
cause" or "duty" in negligence cases. It is clear that the wife
has an interest in the sentimental elements of consortium which
is accorded legal protection against interference through some
kinds of conduct. Thus, if the defendant acted "maliciously"
(i.e., with foresight of the likelihood that consequences such as
these will follow), he has been held liable to the wife. If the
conduct is only intentional, (i.e., there is a substantial certainty
of injury to the husband but no real foresight of the likelihood
that consequences such as these will follow) the cases have
23. Marri v. Stamford St. R. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911);
Hehmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945) ; Bolger
v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910); Clark v.
Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 144 Kan. 344, 58 P.2d 1128 (1936); Blair
v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915); Golden v.
R. L. Greene Paper Co., 44 R.I. 231, 116 Atl. 579 (1923).
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denied recovery, and, as indicated, they have denied recovery in
cases where the defendant's conduct could be characterized only
as negligence. This suggests that while the interference may be
as serious in one case as in the other, the moral character of
the defendant's conduct varies the result.
In the instant case the court apparently felt that in view of
the modern attitude toward the value of the wife's interest in
the sentimental elements of consortium, even conduct which is
only negligent is sufficiently legally blameworthy, so that the
balance of interests is in favor of recovery. This means, of
course, that the court thinks it not unfair to hold the defendant
liable for these consequences, simply because the wife's interest
which was interfered with is sufficiently important to justify
such an extension of liability. In reaching its conclusion the
court took into consideration the inherent unfairness of treating
a husband's interest in the sentimental elements of consortium
differently from that of a wife, certainly a valid factor. It is not
necessary to agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the
court in order to recognize the inherent value of the opinion.
The court has gone far toward cutting down the forest of
verbiage surrounding the earlier decisions, and toward recog-
nizing clearly the real nature of the problem presented to it.
WARREN MAICHEL
JURY TRIAL - NECESSITY OF JUDGE RECEIVING THE VERDICT.
In a recent Tennessee case,1 condemnation proceedings were
begun by the plaintiff. The trial court judge was unavoidably
detained, so he called a member of the local bar and asked him to
receive the verdict of the jury. Plaintiff objected to this pro-
cedure and immediately made a motion for a mistrial. The
motion was overruled and the verdict received. In sustaining
plaintiff's contention upon appeal, the court said that receipt of
the jury's verdict under these circumstances was a nullity and
void; that no consideration of public policy would justify the
conclusion that a member of the bar, by merely assuming the
judge's position, could clothe himself with the powers of a judge.
Whether a trial court judge can delegate his duty of receiv-
1. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Vineyard et ux., 232 S.W.2d 403(Tenn. 1950).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss2/9
